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RECENT DECISIONS
Negligence-Abolition of the Doctrine of Assumption of Risk
in Host-Guest Cases: Recently the Wisconsin Supreme Court reappraised its position on the application of the doctrine of assumption of risk to automobile host-guest cases and overruled its effect
as a complete defense, per se, for the defendant host.'
The facts of the case at bar were similar to many instances where
the doctrine had been previously applied. Plaintiff, guest, received
injuries when his host collided with another auto on a town road.
The evidence showed that the host and guest had recently left a
tavern where they had been for some time and were en route to a
party when the accident occurred.
In the trial court, the jury found defendant-host 85% causally
negligent as to management and control and position on the highway, while plaintiff-guest was found to be 15% causally negligent
in regard to lookout. The driver of the other vehicle was found to
be non-negligent; this, coupled with a finding that plaintiff assumed
the risk as to defendant's negligence, made recovery impossible.
Plaintiff's attorney, in view of language expressed by the court in
a recent case,2 made a motion after verdict for a new trial on the
ground that plaintiff's willingness to ride with defendant, host,
should have been submitted in terms of negligence and not assumption of risk, thereby permitting partial recovery, under "Wisconsin's
comparative negligence statute. 3 Upon denial of the motion the
plaintiff appealed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in modifying the application of
the doctrine of assumption of risk, promulgated the following rules
of law:
(1) The driver of an automobile owes his guest the same
duty of ordinary care that he owes to others; (2) a guest's
assumption of risk, heretofore implied from his willingness to
proceed in the face of a known hazard is no longer a defense
separate from contributory negligence; (3) if a guest's exposure
of himself to a particular hazard be unreasonable and a failure
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, such conduct
is negligence
and is subject to the comparative negligence
4
statute.

By this decision the court overruled much existing case law
and reversed its policy in an area that is almost as old as the automobile itself. In light of this, I shall trace the doctrine from its in' McConville v. State Farm M'futual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.
2d 14 (1962).

2 Baird v. Cornelius, 12 Wis. 2d 284, 287, 303; 107 N.W. 2d 278 (1961).

Wis. STAT. Sec. 331.045 (1959).
4 Supra note 1, at 378, 113 N.W. 2d 16.
3
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ception to the present to examine the plausibility of the change.
The doctrine of assumption of risk originally sprang up as a defense
in master-servant and contractual cases. It is characterized by the
maxim "volenti non fit injuria" meaning that to which a person assents is not esteemed in law an injury.5 But as characterized in
negligence cases, the maxim does not denote exactly the nature of
the defense for in effect when the court states that a plaintiff assumed the risk of injury, it does not infer that he chose voluntarily
to incur a known danger but rather to state the position of the
plaintiff where the defendant was under no duty to him or if under
duty to him, was not violating it.6
These ideas are reflected in the policy which was adopted by the
Wisconsin courts in holding that an automobile host should not
be held to as high a standard of responsibility for injury to his
guest as for injury to one not in that relationship;
The principle represents an evaluation of the relationship itself, including a concept that the guest is in the automobile
as a matter of grace, not right, that he is free to ride or not
to ride, and must protest or else be silent, at his own risk,
and that the host as a benefactor of the guest merits protection from liability to one to whom the host has extended a
favor.7
Working from this basic premise, Wisconsin courts first limited
the doctrine to contractual cases" but later expanded and modified
it to cover certain aspects of automobile negligence where a consensual relationship of host and guest existed. This consensual relationship being similar to that of contract, having only the element
of consideration lacking.9
The doctrine as applied to automobile cases required the finding
of three component elements to bar a guest's recovery against his
host: (1) a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of the
guest; (2) appreciation of the hazard by the guest and (3) acquiesence or willingness to proceed in the face of the danger. 10 If
the guest could prove that one of these elements was lacking upon
the host's affirmative tender of the defense, the doctrine would fail
to operate.
Under the former rule the duty owed a guest by his host was
likened to that of a licensor-licensee relationship, the duty of the
driver being not to increase the danger or add a new one.11 Ex5 Am. aJU.
Negligence, Sec. 171.
6 Ibid.
Supra note 1, at 378, 113 N.W. 2d 16.
8Knauer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 159 Wis. 7, 149 N.W. 494 (1914).
9 Switzer v. Weiner, 230 Wis. 599, 284 N.W. 509 (1939).
10 Kimball v. Mathey, 252 Wis. 194, 31 N.W. 2d 184 (1948).
11 O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 462, 185 N.W. 525 (1921).
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amples of what this encompassed appear in the now overruled cases:
(1) the guest entering an auto took it with the defects not known
to the host ;12 (2) the guest assumed the danger incident to the
known incompetency, inexperience

3

or habits 14 of the driver; (3)

the guest was to exercise due care for his own safety in the matter
of maintaining a lookout ;15 (4) the guest assumed the danger incident to the character and purpose of the trip' 6 which could be
proved by his lack of protest in proceeding in light of the apparent
17

hazard.

Thus, when the plaintiff-guest was confronted with this affirmative defense, he had to make a positive showing that an essential element was lacking or negatived in order to recover. The
most prominent rebuttal was a showing of adequate protest on the
part of the guest which thereby removed the element of acquiesence to the host's negligent driving."'
The court also attempted prior to this decision to ameliorate
the harshness of the rule by not applying the doctrine in cases
where the host's momentary failure or negligence was the cause of
the accident. The rationale being, that this type of negligence afforded no time for protest, for a guest in an auto is considered to
have acquiesed only where the course of driving has persisted long
enough to give him sufficient opportunity to protest. 19 The court
has also held that if a host driver was found guilty of several acts
of negligence such as improper lookout and excessive speed, and it
was found that the guest only assumed the negligence as to speed,
such assumption of risk did not preclude the host's liability for the
type of negligence not assumed.2 0 Furthermore, if another vehicle
was involved in the collision the doctrine would not bar recovery
from a third person for injuries to which the negligence of the
21
third person proximately contributed.
These cases, although ameliorating somewhat the rule's harshness, proved insufficient to afford the guest adequate protection
under present day travel conditions. The court thus formulated a
policy change whereby the host or driver of an automobile will
owe his guest the same duty of ordinary care that he owes other
members of the community. 22
12Ibid.
'1 Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Vis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 (1926).
'4 Olson v. Hermansen, 196 Wis. 614, 220 N.W. 203 (1928).
's Howe v. Corey, 172 Wis. 537, 179 N.W. 791 (1920).
16 Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 163, 223 N.W. 408 (1929).

". Knipfer v. Shaw, 210 Wis. 617, 246 N.W. 328, 247 N.W. 320 (1933).
"8Krause v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290 (1928).
"9Groh v. W. 0. Krahn Inc., 223 Wis. 662, 271 N.W. 374 (1937).
20 Bronk v. Mijal, 275 Wis. 194, 81 N.W. 2d 481 (1957).
21
Kauth v. Landsverk, 224 Wis. 554, 271 N.W. 841 (1937).
22 Supra note 1, at 383, 113 N.W. 2d 19.
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This policy change as to the driver's duty appears to have its
real basis in the court's recognition that the doctrine of assumption
of risk, with its premise of implied consent, should no longer operate as a complete defense per se in the area of automobile negligence law. The reasoning was that vast changes have occurred in
the automobile and its uses. These changes when coupled with the
often unjust results produced by application of the doctrine give
rise to an inequitable situation that denies recovery for injuries
23
without a weighing of the comparative fault of the parties.
Under the new rule the guest's act of riding with the host may
constitute no defense, a partial defense or a complete defense depending on the circumstances of each particular case. The host will
have no defense if the guest's willingness to proceed in the face of
a known hazard would not be unreasonable when taken into consideration with the utility of riding with the host and the inadequacy of an alternative course. Here, the acquiesence would not be
such lack of ordinary care as to raise the defense of contributory
negligence. The defense may be partial where the guest's acquiesence in riding with a particular host with knowledge of the host's
deficiencies is determined by the trier of fact to be a failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, such guest's negligence will
be evaluated in light of all the circumstances, 24 thus possibly permitting partial recovery under the comparative negligence statute.
The defense may be complete when the guest's conduct in light of
the circumstances displays an utter disregard for his own safety
and is such a breach of his duty to exercise ordinary care that even
the finding under the comparative negligence statute will not permit recovery.
The court also recognized the problem that develops when
framing a verdict where the guest was also guilty of active negligence as was true in the case at bar, where the guest's failure to
maintain a lookout was deemed to be contributory negligence and
a cause of the accident. This type of negligence is to be differentiated from that which only pertains to the guest's unreasonable conduct in riding with the deficient host, for this hazard, though not
being a cause of the accident, is a cause of the guest's injuries. Under
such circumstances in a suit against the host the two phases of the
guest's negligence, that percentage causal to the accident and that
percentage causal to his injury, would be coupled and compared
against the failure of the host to determine if there is actual lia2
bility. 5

23 Ibid.
24 Supra note 1, at 379, 113 N.W. 2d 17.

25 Id. at 385, 113 N.W. 2d 20.
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An even more complicated problem arises in situations where
another vehicle is involved in the collision and there are conflicting
claims as to the negligence of the parties involved. Thus, in a single
suit there could be various questions including: (1) whether the
guest has a right of recovery against his host, or the other driver
or both of them; (2) the issue of negligence as between the two
drivers if either claims damages against the other. This is best illustrated in a case in which both the guest and third party driver
seek recovery for damages incurred. In our hypothetical example if
the jury found the following on the guest's claim, what would result?
Guest

Host

Third Party
Driver

Active Negligence
(cause of the
accident)

10% (lookout)

45%

25%

Negligence Arising
From Riding With
Deficient Host
(cause of guest's
injury)

20%

Total

30%

-

45%

25%

Here, the guest could recover 70% of his damages from his host.
The finding that the third party driver was only 25% negligent in
this question would be immaterial as to his claim against the host
and a separate comparison question determining their respective
26
rights as between themselves would be required.
In appraising the decision, it appears that the policy adopted
will produce more equitable results, though for the time being the
procedural aspects in reaching the verdict may be a source of difficulty, even with proper instructions the jury may be confused as
to what is actually expected of them.
It is interesting to note that in a companion case, Colson v.
Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W. 2d 21 (1962), the court also abrogated
the doctrine in farm labor cases. Section 331.37(3) which abolished
assumption of risk as a defense in employer-employee controversies,
had expressly excluded farm laborers from its protection. However
the court held that in the future this type of case would be decided
on a contributory negligence basis and subjected to Wisconsin's
comparative negligence statute thereby permitting partial recovery.
26

Ibid.
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By these two decisions, Wisconsin has placed strict limitations
on the application of assumption of risk. It appears that this was
necessitated by the nature of the particular areas involved, where
past experience had shown resulting injustice to an injured party
whose fault was based on a theory of implied consent. It remains
questionable whether these decisions will open the door to future
amelioration of the doctrine in other areas. One of these areas that
is especially noteworthy relates to the plight of a spectator who
sustains injury upon attendance at a sporting event. The language
of a recent case 27 appears to make the doctrine applicable in barring recovery if the injury is caused by a known hazard that is
incident or natural to the sport.
-JEROME E. GULL
Evidence: Inference Remaining after Presumption RebuttedThe plaintiff, Herman Schlichting, was an eighty-four year old
widower who lived on his homestead farm with four of his sons;
John, Christian, Carl and Ulrich. John took care of much of the
business affairs of both his aged father and his brother Christian,
handling the money and supplying the information for income tax
returns. On November 24, 1958, Herman had a married son, August,
appointed as his conservator.
On December 1, 1958, Herman conveyed his homestead to Christian without any consideration. Thereafter, a family dispute arose
over the conveyance, and on December 15, 1958, Christian conveyed
the tract to John, again without consideration.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that John,
in handling Herman's business affairs, stood in a relationship of
trust and confidence, dominating both Herman and Christian. Under
these circumstances, the Court felt that the intermediate transfer
to Christian was of no consequence, and a presumption that John
exercised undue influence over Herman arose out of the transaction.'
The Court discussed rebuttable presumptions, dividing them
into two basic categories. The first type includes those presumptions which are "invoked by the law for reasons of public policy
without regard to whether the presumption thus invoked is likely
to bear any reasonable relationship to the actual fact presumed."
The second classification includes those presumptions "in which
the facts upon which [they are] based reasonably give rise to an inference of the ultimate conclusion embodied in the presumption."
Lee v. National League Baseball Club, 4 Wis. 2d 168, 176-78, 89 N.W. 2d 811
(1958).
1 Schlichting v. Schlichting, 15 Wis. 2d 147, 112 N.W. 2d 149 (1961).
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